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A B S T R A C T
Effective criminal investigation depends on reliable access to evidence.With the extensive
use of cloud computing in various forms, electronic evidence of criminal activity may no
longer be found with criminals or their associates themselves. Rather, the evidence resides
with cloud providers, oftentimes on servers outside of the territory of the investigating law
enforcement authorities (LEAs). Thus, even in otherwise completely domestic criminal in-
vestigations of crime committed domestically against a domestic victim, relevant electronic
evidence may be stored in a cloud arrangement in another country. Obtaining the evi-
dence in those situations may be difficult.
In this article, we identify 16 variables and a number of fundamental and non-
fundamental constraints that must be taken into account by anyone setting out to construct
a framework facilitating appropriate LEA access to evidence via direct contact with cloud
providers, while safeguarding the rights and interest of individuals, as well as the rights
and interest of the provider, and those of other States.
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The ubiquitous use by criminal actors of electronic commu-
nications and storage services offered by cloud providers1 offers
various challenges for criminal investigations. Electronic evi-
dence of criminal activity may no longer be found with
criminals or their associates themselves. Rather, the evi-
dence resides with cloud providers, oftentimes on servers
outside of the territory of the investigating law enforcement
authorities (LEAs).2 The providers holding the evidence may
not be incorporated in that territory or have a subsidiary there
that acts as a “data controller” and is capable of fully comply-
ing with domestic legal process. Obtaining the evidence in those
situations in principle requires mutual legal assistance (MLA),
although providers incorporated in the US may voluntarily
* Corresponding author. Faculty of Law, Bond University, Gold Coast, Queensland 4229, Australia.
E-mail address: Dan_Svantesson@bond.edu.au (D.J.B. Svantesson).
1 We have opted for the term “cloud provider” so as to avoid linking the discussion to any particular previous definition of the parties
concerned. Typically, cloud providers offer services such as infrastructure as a service (IaaS), software as a service (SaaS) and platform
as a service (PaaS). For the purpose of this article, we use the term cloud provider to refer to a range of Internet actors, such as provid-
ers of social media platforms, email providers and data storage providers, holding user data in cloud arrangements.
2 For the purpose of this article, LEAs include judicial authorities such as prosecutors and investigating judges.
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disclose non-content data to foreign LEAs on a direct request,
without intervention of US authorities.3
However, cloud providers with storage facilities in mul-
tiple countries may themselves not be able to establish the
geographical location of the requested data at any given time,
creating uncertainty about the applicable jurisdiction (and with
it the lawful application of investigative powers) and possible
conflicts of, e.g., data protection legislation.
With regard to voluntary disclosure of non-content data by
US-based cloud providers, a coherent, commonly applicable
framework does not exist. Providers currently each have their
own procedures in place for this type of direct cooperation and
make their own assessment of (the legality of) requests in view
of fundamental rights and business considerations.This leads
to a practice where providers may provide different (subsets
of) data in seemingly similar situations, making the process
as a whole at times diffuse and unpredictable for requesting
LEAs.
In March 2016, the Netherlands organised a conference on
the topic of jurisdiction in cyberspace4; the topic of direct co-
operation with US-based cloud providers was discussed, and
it was concluded that “establishing a clear cooperation frame-
work could benefit States, private sector and its customers as it would
increase legal certainty”.5 In this article we will discuss the rel-
evant considerations that we feel need to be taken into account
when devising such a framework.
According toWalden,6 LEAs seeking access to electronic evi-
dence that is held by a foreign cloud provider typically have
four possible courses of action. The LEA may:
(1) seek the assistance of the relevant foreign LEA via formal
mutual legal assistance (MLA);
(2) seek informal assistance from the relevant foreign LEA;
(3) seek direct assistance of the foreign cloud provider (that
is, without intervention by foreign authorities) or
(4) seek direct access to the data (without third party
cooperation).7
To this, we would propose to add fifth and sixth possible
courses of action. The LEA may:
(5) (spontaneously) share information from the criminal in-
vestigation with the foreign LEA, in order to enable them
to initiate a domestic investigation – that way, evi-
dence may be acquired domestically, to be subsequently
(and spontaneously8) shared with the LEA from the origi-
nal country;
(6) (spontaneously) share information from the criminal in-
vestigation with the foreign LEA, which may then
investigate and prosecute domestically – this would
prevent the need to transfer cloud evidence over borders
altogether.9
For the purpose of this article, we will focus on option 3:
direct cooperation with the foreign cloud provider. Obviously,
much can be improved in the current system of MLA,10 but
where such improvements may diminish the need for alter-
native means of access, it is unlikely that they will eliminate
that need altogether. Furthermore, given the fact that sub-
stantial changes to the current frameworks which regulate MLA
will undoubtedly take a long time to negotiate and effectu-
ate, alternative means of access should, at least for now, be
considered to deal with the current challenges of evidence gath-
ering from the cloud. An agreement on alternative means of
access could also take some of the current burden of the MLA
system, which on its own could improve its functioning.Thus,
a discussion on direct cooperation with cloud providers is nec-
essary whether or not we also improve the MLA system as such.
Our aim is to map out the interests and considerations that
need to be taken into account in pursuit of a common frame-
work (whatever form it may take), which would regulate the
acquisition of evidence via direct contact with (foreign) cloud
providers. We do so with the consideration that such coop-
eration should contain strong safeguards for fundamental rights
and personal and legal interests of individuals whose data it
concerns, as well as the rights and interest of the cloud
3 Title 18, paragraph 2702 of the US Federal Criminal Code. This
provision was introduced as part of the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy act of 1986 (ECPA), of which the second title was
enacted as the Stored Communications Act. Non-content data con-
sists of Basic Subscriber Information (BSI) and transactional data
(such as traffic data and connection history), insofar as that data
is “at rest”. The acquisition of data “in motion” is generally con-
sidered a greater infringement on fundamental rights and for that
reason requires judicial oversight. In practice, the process of vol-
untary disclosure of non-content data under ECPA is considerably
faster than the MLA process.
4 “Crossing Borders: Jurisdiction in Cyberspace”, 7–8 March 2016,
Amsterdam. The conference report (7323/16) can be found at
<https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXV/EU/09/79/EU_97921/
imfname_10617852.pdf>.
5 Page 10 of the conference report.
6 Ian Walden, “Law Enforcement Access to Data in Clouds,” in
Christopher Millard (ed), Cloud Computing Law (OUP 2013) 297.
7 Ibid. As to the option of seeking direct access to the data, this
may be sought to be justified by a claim of jurisdiction on various
basis, including e.g. on the ground of universal jurisdiction. That
option will not be pursued further in this article.
8 As meant in article 26 of the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime (commonly referred to as the Budapest Convention)
of 2001.
9 A formal request to transfer criminal proceedings to the foreign
country would fall under option 1 described above.
10 See: Anna-Maria Osula, “Accessing extraterritorially located data




anna-maria-osula.pdf>;Vivek Krishnamurthy, “Cloudywith a Conflict
of Laws” (16 February 2016), Berkman Center Research Publica-
tion No. 2016-3 Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2733350> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2733350>; Gail Kent,
“Sharing Investigation Specific Data with Law Enforcement – An
International Approach” (14 February 2014), Stanford Public
Law Working Paper <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2472413> or
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2472413>.
672 c om pu t e r l aw & s e cu r i t y r e v i ew 3 2 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 6 7 1 – 6 8 2
provider and those of other States.11 Our exercise is not dis-
similar to that of Daskal andWoods, but where their approach
is explicitly US-centric, our approach is, in essence, jurisdic-
tion neutral.12 Our mapping exercise is meant to facilitate the
discussion on (improved) cooperation between governments
and cloud providers. However, we do not weigh these consid-
erations against each other, nor do we propose any order in
which they should be addressed.
2. The variables and the possible scenarios
they create
The task outlined above is not an easy one.And it is mademore
complex by the fact that situations falling into the third cat-
egory outlined above are characterised by diversity rather than
homogeneity. For example, among the scenarios where LEAs
seek the assistance of the foreign cloud provider, we need to
(1) distinguish between (typically faster) requests to the parent
company and (typically slower) requests that go via domestic
subsidiaries.13 Further, we are also required to (2) distinguish
between, on the one hand, access sought on an entirely vol-
untarily basis, and access based on legal process on the other
hand. On a practical level, one may also imagine a third – semi-
voluntary – option: LEAs requesting voluntary access with the
threat of coercive measures where voluntary access is not pro-
vided. In addition, within the category of access through legal
process we find different types of instruments such as war-
rants and subpoenas (typically in the form of production orders
or search warrants).
These scenariosmust be kept separate from situations where
LEA seek access to evidence from a domestic cloud provider,
such as where a US LEA seeks access to data directly from
Microsoft, Google or Facebook. For the purpose of this article
we use the term “domestic cloud provider” where the pro-
vider is incorporated in the country where the criminal
investigation is being conducted, although we do acknowl-
edge that in light of, inter alia, theYahoo! versus Belgium case14
and the Weltimmo15 ruling by the European Union’s Court of
Justice, the prefix “domestic” may be somewhat legally am-
biguous in the context of cloud providers.
Regardless of how we define “domestic cloud providers”
though, the category as such contains a diversity of possible
situations. For example, we could (3) distinguish situations
where the data sought relates to a citizen of the State of the
11 See: Jennifer Daskal & Andrew KeaneWoods, “Cross-border data
requests: a proposed framework” (2015) <https://lawfareblog.com/
cross-border-data-requests-proposed-framework>; Andrew Keane
Woods, “A proposal to improve foreign law enforcement access to
US-held data” (2015) <https://justsecurity.org/26461/proposal-
improve-foreign-law-enforcement-access>; Jennifer Daskal and
Andrew Keane Woods, “A new US-UK data sharing treaty?” (2015)
<https://www.justsecurity.org/24145/u-s-u-k-data-sharing-
treaty>; Jennifer Daskal, “The Microsoft warrant case: the policy
issues” (2015) <https://www.justsecurity.org/25901/microsoft-
warrant-case-policy-issues>.
12 Although of course we acknowledge that because of the global
dominance of US-incorporated cloud providers, a workable frame-
work is not really imaginable without inclusion of the US
perspective.
13 Although exceptionsmight exist.Typically, requests sent through
the subsidiary are assessed by or in coordination with the mother
company.
14 Court de Cassation, 1 December 2015. See: <http://english
.eu2016.nl/binaries/eu2016-en/documents/publications/2016/03/7/
b-yahoo-court-of-cassation-iii—1-december-2015/b-yahoo-court-
of-cassation-iii-1-december-2015.pdf>. An (brief) analysis of the
Court’s decision can be found at <https://www.stibbe.com/en/
news/2016/january/benelux-tmt-cassation-confirms-yahoos-
obligation-to-cooperate-with-law-enforcement-agencies>. See also
the description of a Danish Supreme Court Order delivered on
Thursday 10 May 2012 (Case 129/2011), by Lars Bo Langsted and
Helena Lybæk Guƒmundsdóttir, (2013) 10 Digital Evid & Electronic
Sig LR 162-5 <http://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/2038/
1975>.
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investigating LEA from situations where the domestic cloud
provider is asked to provide data relating to a foreign na-
tional. This distinction is based on the assumption that the
citizenship of the data subject is always known. However, when
requesting data from a cloud provider, LEAs oftentimes do not
(yet) know the nationality of the customer whose informa-
tion it concerns.16 This may impede direct cooperation, since
cloud providers frequently do factor in the (presumed) nation-
ality of the customer. As a guiding principle for operational
processes then, citizenship is perhaps not the most useful.
In the context of data held by the domestic cloud provid-
ers, we further (4) distinguish between situations where the
data held by the domestic cloud provider is stored domesti-
cally (i.e. on a server located in the same country) and situations
where the data, while controlled by a domestic cloud provider,
is stored in another country.This is specifically relevant in view
of data protection regulations. However, here too wemust factor
in the possibility of lack of knowledge, in the sense that we
need to take account of the fact that the location where the
data is held at any given time may be unknown – even to the
cloud provider.17 Furthermore, for some jurisdictions this dis-
tinction is legally irrelevant and lawful control over the data,
irrespective of its geographical location, would suffice to serve
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The most complications arise where data is stored locally,
but is controlled by a foreign company without a subsidiary
in the country of the LEA. Such situations are more compli-
cated than situations where the cloud provider has some
corporate presence in that country. By contrast, the easiest situ-
ation to deal with is where the data is stored locally and the
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Summarising the above, we have identified six variables that
need to be taken into account: (1) the country of the investi-
gating LEA, (2) the country of incorporation of the cloud provider,
(3) the existence of subsidiaries in the country of the investi-
gating LEA, (4) the nationality (or habitual residence) of the
person to whom the data relates (to the extent ascertain-
able), (5) the manner in which access is sought (i.e. voluntarily
or through legal process) and (6) the location of the data (to
the extent ascertainable).
To this, the following variables may be added: (7) the na-
tionality of the suspect(s), (8) the nationality of the victim(s),
(9) the location(s) of the suspect(s) at the time of the crime,
(10) the location(s) of the victim(s) at the time of the crime,
(11) the habitual residence of the suspect(s), (12) the habitual
residence of the victim(s) and (13) the availability of alterna-
tive means of gaining access to the data, such as via MLA or
16 Possible identifiers include usernames, IP-addresses, time-
stamps, language and declared nationality (for instance on a
personal page). However, none of those are in themselves a reli-
able basis to establish the nationality of the subject.
17 For load balancing purposes and to expedite data retrieval by
the customer, data from a single user profile may be stored on
servers in multiple jurisdictions at the same time (for instance, BSI
and transactional data in the country of incorporation and content
data in a storage facility that is geographically close to the loca-
tion of the customer). This data may be continually in motion.
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through direct access by the investigating LEA.18 Further-
more, in some situations we also need to consider (14) the
habitual residence of the witness(es) as well as (15) the loca-
tion of the witness(es) whose data is sought. In order to
construct a framework facilitating appropriate LEA access to
evidence via direct contact with cloud providers, this great di-
versity of variables needs to be taken into account.
3. A proposed method
We have no opinion whether or not the diversity in situa-
tions we described above should be reflected in a common
framework for direct cooperation with cloud providers. For the
purpose of this article, we will focus on certain generally ap-
plicable interests and considerations that would at least need
to be taken into account when devising a common frame-
work of any sort.To map out these interests and considerations,
we will apply parts of a 10-step research method developed
and published by Svantesson some years ago.19 In this re-
search method, the first four steps can be viewed as the
analytical phase, with step one defining the problem or re-
search question. Step two seeks to identify any constraints that
fundamentally impact on the issue. For example, if one is to
find a solution to the regulation of Internet defamation, one
cannot ignore the right to free speech – the human right of
freedom of expression is therefore a fundamental constraint. Step
three seeks to identify other, less significant constraints that
should be taken into account.We can call them non-fundamental
constraints. Once all the constraints have been identified, step
four is to assess how the constraints interact. For example, some
constraints will strengthen each other, while others will be each
other’s opposites, requiring careful balancing. In this context
it must be noted that while certain constraints are fundamen-
tal in nature, they may not be absolute. In other words, the
observation that the right to freedom of expression is a fun-
damental constraint for any solution to the regulation of
Internet defamation does not mean that that right is abso-
lute and may never be limited.
Applied correctly, steps two (the identification of funda-
mental constraints), three (the identification of non-
fundamental constraints) and four (the assessment of how the
constraints interact) ensure that the method takes account of
the context of the problem that is addressed, thereby dispos-
ing of one of the traditional criticisms of stricter doctrinal
research methodologies.20
The next steps of the research method (steps five to seven)
make up the information gathering phase, which is doctrinal
in nature and involves an examination of how the problem has
been addressed so far (step five), an examination of how similar
problems have been addressed so far (step six) and then a criti-
cal evaluation of the approaches identified (step seven).
In steps eight, nine and ten (the construction phase), the
researcher must construct the solution (step eight) and then
test it against the fundamental and non-fundamental con-
straints (step nine), as well as against any relevant likely future
technological developments and uses (step ten). Steps nine and
ten work to ensure that the solution serves the purposes it was
intended to serve and has the effects it ought to have when
put in the context it will operate.
4. The scope of this article
For the purpose of our article we will largely restrict our-
selves to steps one, two and three.Thus, our aim is limited and
rather modest. However, we envisage that the research model
outlined above may fruitfully be applied for the larger task of
designing a common framework – whether as a voluntary code
of conduct or a binding international agreement – facilitating
LEA access to evidence via direct contact with cloud provid-
ers. In that sense, what we are doing here can be seen as taking
the critical first steps of a longer, indeed much longer, journey.
We say critical first steps because they set the direction for all
the following steps.
5. Step one – framing the research question
The above has already brought us to the research question.This
questionmay be formulated as: What considerations must be taken
into account in order to create a framework (whichever form it takes)
for facilitating lawful LEA access to evidence held by cloud provid-
ers, by way of direct contact with those providers, while safeguarding
the rights and interest of individuals, as well as the rights and in-
terest of the provider, and those of other States?
The process of devising such a common framework needs
to include a dialogue with a range of parties including gov-
ernments, cloud providers, LEAs, international organisations
with relevant expertise (e.g. the Council of Europe) and aca-
demia.The process will likely be difficult and long, but the topic
is of such fundamental importance that it should not be put
off any longer. This urgency was recently recognised by the
Council of Justice Ministers of the European Union, in their
recent adoption of conclusions which aim to improve crimi-
nal justice in cyberspace.21
18 The Budapest Convention allows such access in certain situa-
tions, described in article 32. However, the Convention does not
preclude States from legislating other means of direct access. One
such example is article 88ter of the Belgian Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, which allows for cross-border preservation of electronic
evidence.
19 Dan Svantesson, “A legal method for solving issues of Internet
regulation” (Autumn 2011) 19(3), Intl JL & Info Tech, 243–63.
20 William Twining, “Academic Law and Legal Development”, in
Taylor Lectures 1975 (University of Lagos Faculty of Law 1976) 20,
as found inTerry Hutchinson, Researching and writing in law (3rd edn,
Lawbook 2010) 22.
21 Conclusions of 9 June 2016 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
press/press-releases/2016/06/09-criminal-activities-cyberspace/>. As
part of the Conclusions, the Commission is “requested to develop
a common framework for cooperation with service providers for
the purpose of obtaining specific categories of data, in particular
subscriber data, when allowed by third countries legislation or any
other comparable solution that allows for a quick lawful disclo-
sure of such data”.
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6. Step two – fundamental constraints
The fundamental constraints that step two of the method
invites us to identify are constraints of such fundamental im-
portance to the research task defined in step one that a solution
that does not take account of them simply cannot be ac-
cepted. In other words, fundamental restraints represent the limits
to any acceptable solution.
The constraints discussed here come in at least three dif-
ferent, but partly overlapping forms. There are practical
constraints, such as technical and legal realities, regulatory con-
straints (such as applicable law that must be taken into account)
and aspirational constraints (such as constraints that make ref-
erence to societal goals).
We argue that we can identify, at least, 25 such fundamen-
tal constraints (discussed below in no particular order and in
varying depth), and by mapping them out, we are one step
closer to being in a position to start constructing a workable
and acceptable framework. Alternatively, for anyone who has
already embarked on the journey towards designing a frame-
work facilitating appropriate LEA access to evidence via direct
contact with cloud providers, the fundamental constraints out-
lined here may serve as a useful checklist to assess the work
they have done so far.
As was outlined above, currently US-based providers are in
a position to provide non-content data on a voluntary basis.
Whether a common framework should maintain that basis of
voluntary cooperation or replace it with a set of coercive mea-
sures is not up to us. Either way, the constraints listed below
will be relevant and fundamental.
(1) Cloud providers have a duty to comply with appropri-
ate legal process, resulting in an obligation to comply
with or endure legitimate law enforcement measures.
This duty is obvious and flows from the rule of law. Also,
compliance with legitimate LEA requests could serve cor-
porate interests.22 The difficulty in the international arena
is to identify and delineate which legal obligations apply
to a particular cloud provider in any given situation.23 The
strength of the duty to comply is primarily dependent on
the degree of connection between the State of the inves-
tigating LEA and the State where the cloud has its offices.
Domestic legal process does not necessarily compel a cloud
provider that is located abroad, unless the authorities of the
foreign State transpose such legal process or when legal
process is mutually recognised by both the State of the LEA
and the State of the cloud provider.24
(2) Cloud providers have a duty to be respectful of the
human rights (such as privacy) of their customers.
This duty flows from a range of human rights treaties, such
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and in the context of Europe, the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union 2000 which contains a specific right
to the protection of personal data.Whereas traditionally the
positive obligation to protect human rights falls upon govern-
ments and not on individuals or corporations, cloud
providers nevertheless have a duty to be respectful of human
rights, such as privacy and protection of personal data.25 This
duty is relevant in assessing whether, and to what degree,
to assist LEAs and how to deal with information received
by LEAs in search of information held by the provider.
However, in practice there is great diversity in how cloud
providers factor in basic human rights in their assess-
ment of direct requests. For example, some cloud providers
only provide data with regard to IP-addresses that resolve
to the territory of the requesting LEA, due to privacy con-
siderations. Other cloud providers do not make this
reservation, but they, too, make their considerations based
on the right to privacy. It seems then that cloud providers
hold different views on how fundamental rights guide their
actions in relation to LEA requests.
As said, while rights such as the right to privacy and pro-
tection of personal data are fundamental, they are not
absolute – in other words, they are constantly subject to bal-
ancing exercises involving other, sometimes competing,
fundamental human rights.
(3) Cloud providers have a duty to be respectful of the
human rights (such as privacy, protection of personal
data and reputation, protection against crime etc.) of
non-customers.
What was said above regarding the duty of cloud provid-
ers to be respectful of the human rights of their customers
22 See generally e.g.: JF Corkery, M Mikalsen, & K Allan, Corporate
social responsibility: The good corporation (Centre for Commercial Law,
Bond University 2015).
23 We are not just talking about obligations that stem from pro-
cedural criminal law, but also from data protection regulation and
contractual relations.
24 Although there are different views on this matter, as is clear
from the Yahoo! v Belgium ruling. However, for practical reasons, here
we will not discuss in depth if the traditional means of enforcing
jurisdictional claims in an international context is still feasible in
the age of cloud computing.
25 Horizontal violations of fundamental rights may lead to civil
litigation or class actions lawsuits. An example of this are the law-
suits filed against Facebook by Austrian privacy advocate Max
Schrems, following the ruling of the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (CJEU) from 6 October 2015 (ECLI:EU:C:2015:650). In that
ruling, the CJEU, inter alia, rendered the Safe Harbour Agreement
between the EU and the US invalid. It is interesting to note that,
although the right to privacy was a central element in that pro-
cedure, the Court was only requested (paragraph 36) to adjudicate
the obligation of the competent national data protection author-
ity to investigate a complaint in view of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union 2000 and the Safe Harbour Agree-
ment. It could be argued that, had the questions referred to the
CJEU more expressively concerned the compatibility of the Safe
Harbour Agreement with the rights to privacy and protection of
personal data (as laid down in articles 7 and 8 of the Charter) or,
perhaps more relevant, had the case been brought before the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights (ECHR), it is entirely possible that
the ECHR (with a referral to, inter alia, its ruling in K.U. vs Finland,
no. 2872/02, 2 December 2008 and subsequent jurisprudence) would
have held Ireland in violation of Mr Schrems’ right to privacy (as
laid down in article 8 of the ECHR), by not fulfilling its positive ob-
ligation to investigate Mr Schrems’ legitimate complaint to the Irish
Data Protection Commissioner.
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also applies here, but the practical considerations of the pro-
vider with regard to the response to direct requests from
LEAs may be different. This may have to do with the fact
that while customers gain some, albeit typically limited, pro-
tection from the applicable terms of use, generally no such
protection is offered to non-customers.
(4) Cloud providers cannot comply with conflicting
obligations.
To understand the environment in which cloud providers
operate, we may usefully adopt a perspective examining
what we can call their “contextual legal system”, by which
we refer to the system of legal rules that purport to apply
to the conduct of the cloud provider in the context of their
economic activities.26 Where a cloud provider is economi-
cally active in multiple jurisdictions, that contextual legal
system may contain conflicting obligations. This may even
prompt the cloud provider to consider wilful non-compliance
with the legal obligations of Country A, in order to comply
with those of Country B. Such situations are of course un-
fruitful, harmful and should be avoided.After all, subjectivity
to the rule of law should not be an economic consider-
ation but a universally binding principle.Where conflicting
obligations cannot be eliminated, the option of providing
cloud providers with immunity or other forms of protec-
tion (such as so-called “clawback” statutes) should be
considered.27
At the same time, it should be noted that such conflicts in
practice might be less common than what generally is
assumed, at least from the perspective of procedural crimi-
nal law. First of all, conflicts generally do not arise in MLA
situations, since in principle the requested country will have
to transpose the foreign judicial order to a domestic one.28
In those situations, the coercive force exerted on the cloud
provider stems from that domestic legal process.29 A con-
flict of obligations stemming from criminal procedural law
is therefore unlikely. Furthermore, a situation of conflict-
ing obligations would seem logically impossible where
disclosure of data is voluntary.
Genuine conflicting duties may arise in scenarios like the
ongoing Microsoft warrant case,30 where the cloud provider
is simultaneously under a duty to disclose data under the
laws of one country (in this case, the US) and (arguably)
under a duty not to do so under the laws of another country
(in this case, Ireland).These situations will likely only become
more prevalent with continuing globalisation.Thus, the con-
cerns are genuine. And until workable solutions have been
found for this issue, we cannot really expect the degree of
voluntary cooperation from cloud providers to be optimal.31
Thus, moving forward, it is important that in devising a
common framework, domestic legal systems are not viewed
independently, but that the focus is on what we refer to as
“jurisdictional interoperability”, the synergy between differ-
ent domestic legal systems. To that end, uniting features
should be identified and inconsistencies in and clashes of
domestic legal systems should be addressed and resolved,
both in substantive and procedural law and both from a
criminal law perspective as well as from a data protection
point of view. Special attention must be given to situa-
tions where what is allowed in one country is prohibited
or mandatory in another.32 For example, not all jurisdic-
tions allow for evidence gathering beyond their territory
outside of the formal MLA process.Without addressing this
issue, these countries would not be able to benefit from any
framework that shapes the direct cooperation with foreign
cloud providers. This would create an uneven playing field
for LEAs and their capacities to effectively and efficiently
combat crime. Furthermore, gathering evidence outside of
the MLA process could result in admissibility issues re-
garding the evidence that was received on a direct request.
The process of direct requests currently does not contain
the same judicial guarantees as the MLA process.33 A
common framework for direct cooperation with cloud pro-
viders should address those issues, which may therefore
necessitate changes to current domestic and interna-
tional law.
(5) The idea of territorial sovereignty as the primary nexus
for establishing and enforcing jurisdiction is increas-
ingly at odds with the realities of our interconnected
world, which is characterised by constant and fluid cross-
border interaction.
It is already well established that enforcement jurisdic-
tion does not necessarily extend to transitory data in a world
where it is increasingly harder to assess when data is truly
in motion and when it is at rest.34 Where the data is in
motion, the architecture of the Internet ensures that the
shortest and most reliable route is chosen, which is not
always a straight line from A to B, meaning that data could
26 Dan Svantesson, “The holy trinity of legal fictions undermin-
ing the application of law to the global Internet” (2015) 23(3) Intl
JL & Info Tech, 219-34, 228-30.
27 Dan Svantesson, “Between a rock and a hard place – an inter-
national law perspective of the difficult position of globally active
Internet intermediaries” (2014) 30 Computer L & Sec Rev, 348-56.
28 As remarked upon before, this situation would be different if
legal process was mutually recognised in the involved countries.
29 By coercive force, we mean the obligation to cooperate with or
endure legitimate law enforcementmeasures, in the sense that non-
compliance or resistance constitutes a criminal offense.
30 See: Jennifer Daskal, “The Microsoft warrant case: the policy
issues” (2015) <https://www.justsecurity.org/25901/microsoft-
warrant-case-policy-issues>.
31 Of course, if the cloud provider would legally be prohibited to
disclose, a request for voluntary cooperation should simply be
denied.
32 Dan Svantesson, “The holy trinity of legal fictions undermin-
ing the application of law to the global Internet” (2015) 23(3) Intl
JL & Info Tech, 219–234, 234.
33 The MLA process in principle will allow the judicial authori-
ties of the requesting country to assume that the evidence was
gathered by the authorities of the requested country in a lawful
fashion. Furthermore, the MLA process forces the requesting country
to show that domestic procedures were followed and that the
request is made by the appropriate authority.
34 For instance, for the purpose of cloud services, load-balancing
configurations may require account data to be transferred regu-
larly without active user involvement.A data transfer therefore does
not necessarily constitute a “communication” in the traditional,
legal sense of the word.
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cross many jurisdictions. Furthermore, cloud providers may
store their customers’ data in or close to the territory where
their customers reside for business reasons,35 to allow for
fast access to that data by the user (caching or mirroring),
thereby enhancing the user experience. Similarly, users of
specific cloud communication services may choose to use
that specific service because of many reasons (low cost, peer
pressure, aesthetics, etc.), but usually a deliberate deci-
sion to seek the protection of the legislation of the
jurisdiction where the provider is incorporated is not one
of them. From the above, it is clear that the presence of
(certain types of) data in a certain territory at any given time
is either a result of the business model of the cloud pro-
vider or a technical coincidence, but in any case, often outside
of the influence of the customer.
However, for the purpose of criminal investigations or the
protection of the domestic legal order, territoriality is a
(still) primary guiding principle. We are of course not
discounting that principle as a whole, but it needs to be
pointed out that the Internet and cloud computing surely
have tested this principle to its limits, leading in certain
cases to undesirable or even absurd situations. For in-
stance, LEAs are encountering more and more instances
where hosting services are being off-shored. In the country
where the criminal investigation is conducted, it may be
established that the evidence is located on a server within
that territory, but access to that data may require informa-
tion that is held by a reseller in another country, prompting
a need for mutual legal assistance. Another example is
the, somewhat disturbing, trend in courts from around
the world ordering the global deletion of content violating
local law, where no concerns appear to be raised about
the fact that deleting that content on servers outside of
the court’s territory may interfere with the sovereignty of
foreign States.
In our hyperconnected world, the idea that the State ipso
facto has (exclusive) jurisdiction over all data that is stored
within or that passes its territory is simply not sustain-
able.While territorial thinking is binary – either something
happens on a State’s territory or it does not – the legiti-
macy of jurisdictional claims certainly should not be; there
is always a matter of degree. After all, legitimacy in essence
is a matter of “accepted authority”, the establishment of
which should include a visible weighing of (possibly op-
posing) interests involved. If we are to make progress in the
matter of LEA access to evidence via direct contact with
cloud providers, we need to change our paradigm.We should
perhaps abandon the territoriality principle as the core of
our thinking on jurisdiction and replace it with a test that
better reflects the realities of why data is where. Of course
sovereignty considerations should be a part of this new para-
digm – after all, there still are borders in the physical world,
but the scope would be broader.
We here propose that such a test includes the notion of in-
vestigative jurisdiction36 as introduced by Svantesson. The
essence of that notion is as follows:
In the absence of an obligation under international law to exer-
cise jurisdiction, a State may only exercise jurisdiction where:
(1) there is a substantial connection between the matter and
the State seeking to exercise jurisdiction;
(2) the State seeking to exercise jurisdiction has a legitimate
interest in the matter; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, given the balance
between the State’s legitimate interests and other interests.37
An important consequence of the observation that the le-
gitimacy of any given jurisdictional claim is a matter of
degree, is that it is possible to imagine a gradual system
where the type and detail of data that is provided to a LEA
depended on the strength of the legitimacy of the jurisdic-
tional claim. Under such a system, where a LEA can show
a strong legitimacy of its jurisdictional claim, detailed and
extensive data may be provided to that LEA, while where
a LEA can show only an adequate, but comparatively weak,
basis of its jurisdictional claim, only limited data may be
provided to that LEA.
(6) In approaching the question of jurisdiction, investiga-
tive measures cannot be adequately handled under the
strict rules governing enforcement jurisdiction.
International law typically distinguishes between three types
of jurisdiction: prescriptive jurisdiction, judicial jurisdic-
tion and enforcement jurisdiction. A key reason for the
current difficulties associated with LEA access to evidence
via direct contact with cloud providers is found in the fact
that such investigative measures fall into the category of
enforcement jurisdiction – the type of jurisdiction most
tightly bound up by the territoriality principle. However,
criminal investigations in the cloud test this principle to its
fundamental and practical limits. Two examples may illus-
trate this.
Imagine that State A sends an LEA into State B to arrest a
citizen of State B, in order to bring him before a court in
State A.The legitimacy of that action is dependent on State
A having enforcement jurisdiction (i.e. if its enforcement
jurisdiction extended to the territory of State B).38 Now
imagine that LEA in State A, within its territory, has law-
fully gained access to a laptop belonging to a citizen of State
A.When they examine that laptop, they find that relevant
files are stored locally on the laptop while others are stored
35 Unless, of course, they are obliged by law to store the data within
a certain geographical location. However, such data localisation re-
quirements for the purpose of protection of personal data and
privacy are fairly recent whereas caching and mirroring are long-
standing business practices.
36 Dan Svantesson, “The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Law
– Its Theoretical Justification and Its Practical Effect on U.S. Busi-
nesses” (2014) 50(1), Stan J Intl L, 53–102.
37 See further: Dan Svantesson, “A New Jurisprudential Frame-
work for Jurisdiction: Beyond the Harvard Draft” (2015) 109, Am J
Intl L, Unbound 69 <https://www.asil.org/blogs/new-jurisprudential-
framework-jurisdiction-beyond-harvard-draft> accessed 9April 2016.
This approach to jurisdiction has been endorsed in the Nether-
lands Presidency of the Council of the EU Debriefing Conference
on Jurisdiction in cyberspace (7–8 March 2016,Amsterdam) doc. 7323/
16.
38 Likely, the actions of State A would not pass that test, without
a basis in international law or an explicit consent of State B. More-
over, the “arrest” would likely be perceived as a criminal offence
by State B.
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in on servers in State B. The legitimacy of accessing that
remotely stored data, although dramatically different to the
first situation, would also be dependent of State A having
enforcement jurisdiction, but the outcome of that assess-
ment is arguably much more unambiguous than in the first
example and highlights a need for increased sophistica-
tion in the categorisation of various jurisdictional claims
under public international law.
To make progress we need to recognise that LEA access to
evidence via direct contact with cloud providers may ac-
tually fall into a previously overlooked fourth category of
jurisdiction – what we call investigative jurisdiction (see above)
that can be somewhat more practical in its relationship to
territoriality.
(7) Where a cloud provider enjoys rights in a State where
it has a corporate presence and where that State has a
legitimate interest in the cloud provider, those rights and
interests must be considered when an assessment is
made as to whether the cloud provider should comply
with duties, conflicting with those rights and inter-
ests, stemming from another country.
The relevance of those rights is a matter of degree where
the level of substantial connection and legitimate interest
must be considered. For example, in the absence of other
connecting factors and interest, the State of incorporation
may enjoy a stronger interest in, and connection to, the cloud
provider than does the State where the data happens to sit
on a server. However, this balance may quickly change if
other connecting factors and interests point to an overall
more substantial connection to, and legitimate interest of,
the State where the data sits. In other words, a careful case-
by-case balancing is required.
(8) Different rules are needed for different types of data as
the degree of data privacy sensitivity varies.
This distinction cannot solely rely on the binary distinc-
tion between personal data and non-personal data, which
is typical of data protection laws. Neither should this dis-
tinction solely be based on the differentiation between
subscriber data, transactional data (including traffic data)
and content data (or the even more inelegant distinction
betweenmetadata and data), since the sensitivity of the data
would depend on the service to which the information
relates, the amount of data39 and its intended use. Thus,
while distinctions such as those outlined above are common
in domestic law as well as in international instruments, we
might need more sophisticated delineations that better cor-
respond to the actual privacy implications of the data that
is being disclosed.
Such a distinction is also relevant in view of the extent to
which disclosure of data should be left to the discretion of
cloud providers. As said, currently voluntary disclosure by
US-based cloud providers is limited to non-content data.
Disclosure of content data would typically constitute a
greater infringement on the privacy of the user(s) in ques-
tion. In many countries, this greater impact on privacy is
reflected in a requirement of judicial oversight for the ac-
quisition of communication content. It may be argued that
private entities should perhaps not be encouraged to ad-
judicate the merits of a case in a fashion that under other
circumstances would be the prerogative of judicial authori-
ties. A common framework for direct cooperation should
therefore include reflections on the quasi-judicial nature of
the assessment by cloud providers in view of the extent of
the privacy implications of voluntary disclosures (see also
fundamental constraints 2 and 3 above).
(9) A distinction between access to stored (historical) data
and live data is necessary.
The difference between access to stored data and access
to live data – or perhaps more elegantly, “data at rest and
data in motion” – is well established andmust be recognised
in the discussions.
(10) Digital evidence stored on foreign servers is frequently
relevant in relation to completely domestic crimes.
The way people use information technology has resulted
in a situation where evidence frequently is stored in foreign
jurisdictions even though the criminal activity in ques-
tion is entirely domestic – a local offender, a local act and
a local victim. Imagine for instance a situation where person
A is a drug dealer from Amsterdam. He imports his drugs
by boat. At the seaport in Rotterdam (also in the Nether-
lands), he has several security officers on his payroll, enabling
him to clear the containers that contain the drugs without
inspection. In a criminal investigation into A’s dealings, the
police find out he communicates with his security officers
at the seaport through a Gmail account.
Now, if the police want to obtain information from Google,
they would have to send a request to Google’s offices in the
US or their subsidiary in Ireland, or they would have to send
an MLA request to the American or Irish authorities. This
is somewhat strange, since the crime is committed on Dutch
soil and all the perpetrators are Dutch as well. The only US
nexus is the cloud mail service that is being used. But as
we saw above, in the bulk of these situations, the fact that
(part of) the data is stored abroad is likely a technical co-
incidence. To make things worse, the legal threshold to
acquire content data under US law (the probable cause re-
quirement) is higher than the threshold that needs to be
met under Dutch law. All in all, having to resort to inter-
national cooperation instruments in a situation of a strictly
domestic crime can be a serious impediment to effective
criminal investigations and be very frustrating to boot.40
39 For instance, basic subscriber information relating to an LGBT
communication platform would reveal information about sexual
orientation, which is highly privacy sensitive. Similarly, analysis
of transactional data that covers a prolonged period of time could
yield a more or less complete picture of certain aspects of the per-
sonal life of the person whose information it concerns (and perhaps
a greater invasion of privacy than was foreseen under the origi-
nal request).
40 A possible way forward could be to have the domestic legal re-
quirements of the requesting country be the guiding principle for
the execution of requests for data in cases where the crime and
all its actors are local and the presence of data in the requested
country is merely a technical coincidence. Such a provision could
prevent the need to transpose foreign judicial orders altogether and
would be very similar to a situation of direct recognition or the Eu-
ropean Investigation Order.
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(11) Where fully respected, anonymity – an articulated com-
ponent of some data protection frameworks –
undermines the identification of factors such as the
relevant person’s location, nationality and residence.
Any framework facilitating LEA access to evidence via direct
contact with cloud providers must carefully balance the le-
gitimate calls for anonymous interaction online with other
relevant (and likely competing) interests.
(12) Cloud providers must be transparent as to how many
requests for access they get, from where those re-
quests originate, what those requests relate to, how many
requests result in access being granted, etc.
Several major cloud providers already issue “transparency
reports” outlining this type of information. The reverse is
also possible: in the US, the Attorney General, according to
18 USC §2702 is obligated to report to the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate on the number of voluntary
disclosures by cloud providers. Obviously any disclosure of
information about voluntary cooperation, regardless of who
does the reporting, must be carefully presented so as to not
reveal personal data or interfere with ongoing criminal
investigations.
(13) Cloud providers need to be transparent in their terms
of use as to how they interact with LEAs, including how
they treat the information they receive as part of data
requests.
Transparency is needed, for example, as to when data is vol-
untarily disclosed, when disclosed upon request, when
disclosed under a court order etc. To a degree, but only to
a degree, user expectations can be managed this way.
However, we must be mindful that users rarely read and un-
derstand the terms of use – truly informed consent is
somewhat of a fairy tale concept. In addition to these re-
sources, we must ensure that any framework contains
mechanisms to control how cloud providers treat the –
sometimes very sensitive – data they are provided as part
of the request. For example, we want to avoid a situation
where cloud service users receive targeted advertisement
for lawyers specialising in particular fields corresponding
to the request cloud providers receive from LEAs.
(14) Cloud providers need to be transparent in informing the
affected user where data is in fact communicated to
LEAs, unless there are strong reasons not to inform the
user.
In identifying when a user should not be informed, we can
draw upon existing legislation and practices addressing this
matter.
(15) The urgency of data access will vary from case to case.
Emergency access procedures must be put in place for
certain clearly defined and delineated situations.There are
obvious precedents to build on in this context, and many
cloud providers already have an emergency disclosure pro-
cedure in place.
(16) Individuals have an interest in their data protection
rights.
As is clear from international human rights law, these rights
are fundamental but not absolute (as in unrestricted). We
will not enter here into a detailed consideration of exactly
what those rights are and only stress that that data pro-
tection is both a fundamental right for its own sake and an
enabling right catering for the enjoyment of other funda-
mental human rights such as freedom of expression and
the right to privacy. Undue limitations of the right to data
protection (for instance, due to mass surveillance) or in-
sufficient protection of this right by governments (for
instance by not setting standards for data protection) are
likely to have a chilling effect on the exercise of these other
rights.
(17) Individuals have a general interest in crimes being de-
tected, investigated and prevented and in criminal justice
being served.
This interest is rooted in the proper functioning of society
and exists irrespective of the location from which the crime
was committed and irrespective of the location where evi-
dence necessary to investigate and prosecute may be found.
(18) Victims of crime have a particular interest in crimes being
detected, investigated and prevented and in criminal
justice being served.
This interest exists irrespective of the location from which
the crime was committed and irrespective of the location
where evidence necessary to investigate and prosecute may
be found.
(19) States have a duty to be good world citizens so as to
help legitimate law enforcement actions in other
countries.
The strength of this duty is partly dependent on the type
of crime (e.g. child abuse should concern everyone) and on
the international legal instruments that exist to foster co-
operation between States.
(20) States have a duty to act against criminal activities within
their jurisdiction so as to prevent those criminal activi-
ties affecting other States or their citizens.
This duty is a necessity in the international system, not least
in order to avoid “safe havens”.
(21) States have a duty to be respectful of and to protect
human rights (such as the right to privacy, data pro-
tection, etc.).
Again, this indisputable duty is founded on international
human rights law.
(22) It is not always possible to ascertain the geographical
location of the server on which data resides.
At least currently, it is not always feasible to ascertain the
geographical location with reasonable effort and within a rea-
sonable time. In those situations, even if an extensive search
on a deep technical level might eventually establish the geo-
graphical location, for the purpose of effective criminal
investigations and prosecutions the location may be
assumed to be “unknown”.This is in contrast to the current
rules where the location of the data is a determining factor
in the assessment of whether LEAs lawfully have access to
the data.
(23) In the context of cloud computing, data is frequently dis-
tributed over more than one server, either as duplicates
or simply by the fact that it is broken into small parts.
As a result, data regarding the profile of a single user may
be stored in different jurisdictions simultaneously. This is
an effective and desirable structure, but it is in contrast to
the current rules where the location of the data is a deter-
mining factor in the assessment of whether LEAs lawfully
have access to the data.
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(24) Appropriate procedural safeguards ensuring legiti-
macy of data request must be established.
Such procedural safeguards cannot merely refer to vague
references to human rights standards as these standards
are neither sufficiently clearly defined nor universally agreed
upon. Rather, what amounts to appropriate procedural safe-
guards in the context of LEA access to evidence via direct
contact with cloud providers must be identified in detail.
(25) The proper substantive rules, scope, structure and nature
of any framework for facilitating lawful LEA access to
evidence via direct contact with cloud providers will need
to reflect the differences in the legal traditions of the
countries covered by the framework, but with a minimum
standard to be met.
Substantive and procedural law may bring with them dif-
ferent requirements regarding the type of information
required to meet the burden of proof, the chain of custody
and the presentation of evidence in court.A common frame-
work will need to reflect those differences.At the same time,
there are countries that have different attitudes towards
matters such as human rights and due process. In light of
this, it may be that a framework for facilitating lawful LEA
access to evidence via direct contact with cloud providers
should not (yet) be open to all countries.Thus,while wemust
aim to make our solutions of today scalable to the world
of tomorrow, where hopefully manymore countries can join
the framework, we do not need to try to construct a solu-
tion that caters for request from countries failing to meet
appropriate human rights and due process standards.
As we said before, all these 25 fundamental constraints must
be taken into account when designing a common framework
for facilitating appropriate LEA access to evidence via direct
contact with cloud providers.
7. Step three – non-fundamental constraints
For step three, we will identify the relevant non-fundamental
constraints, but we will not discuss them in depth. Like the
fundamental constraints, the non-fundamental constraints
come in at least three different forms: practical constraints,
regulatory constraints and aspirational constraints. They are
as follows:
(1) It is easier to build on existing instruments (e.g. the
Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on Cyber-
crime) than it is to build an entirely new solution;
(2) Initial consensus is best sought within a group of coun-
tries with broadly similar legal traditions and with a
certain degree of trust in LEA cooperation. The EU is an
obvious candidate in light of its relative existing
harmonisation (and given that many of the relevant data
protection constraints will stem from the EU);
(3) Rules for LEAs should meet principles of transparency
and accountability and should therefore be separate from
rules for intelligence services. At the same time, the
reality is of course that in areas such as corporate es-
pionage and terrorism, it is not always easy to draw sharp
lines between LEA activities and the activities of intel-
ligence services;
(4) Balkanization incurs a cost, a financial cost for inter-
mediaries, and at least an efficiency loss for users;
(5) While perhaps unsurprising in the current climate, uni-
lateral extension of domestic territorial jurisdiction by
allowing LEAs to gain direct access to data held by cloud
providers is unsuitable as a long-term strategy;
(6) The efficiency of the actual cooperation between LEAs
and intermediaries will always and to a great degree,
depend on the extent to which a “culture of coopera-
tion” exists or can be developed;
(7) Harmonisation of substantive law, while useful, is not
likely in the short term, and thus procedural laws must
be coordinated;
(8) It would be appropriate to include limitations as to what
type of crimes will be covered by the framework, allow-
ing LEA access to evidence via direct contact with cloud
providers. First, from a practical perspective, this will
likely help limit the number of requests. Second, given
the privacy concerns involved, perhaps not all crimes are
of such importance as to legitimise the voluntary dis-
closure of privacy sensitive data. In any case, possibilities
to disclose information voluntarily should be limited, in
view of data protection and privacy concerns;
(9) Where a cloud provider hands over data to a LEA, that
process incurs a cost. Onematter to be considered is who
should carry that cost; and
(10) The manner in which information is acquired may
impact its admissibility or reliability when presented as
evidence in courts.
8. Concluding remarks
In this article, we have pointed to 16 variables and a number
of fundamental and non-fundamental constraints that anyone
setting out to construct a framework facilitating appropriate
LEA access to evidence via direct contact with cloud provid-
ers must take into account, either by making sure that their
proposed frameworks actually cater for the rich diversity of sce-
narios those variables make possible or by adopting limitations
narrowing the scope of their proposed frameworks.
As should be clear from the above, thematter discussed here
is complex and necessitates the balancing of a range of im-
portant considerations. And as also ought to be clear, it is not
an area that lends itself to simple – one-dimensional – solu-
tions. In light of this, we do not believe it will be possible to
identify any single ‘connecting factor’, the application of which
will always result in legitimate LEA access to evidence held by
cloud providers, by way of direct contact with those provid-
ers, while safeguarding the rights and interest of individuals,
as well as the rights and interest of the provider, and those
of other States. Interest balancing is the key.
At the same time, we are conscious that any framework
(whichever form it takes) for facilitating lawful LEA access to
evidence held by cloud providers, must be clear enough to be
applied with ease at least in standard situations.
At any rate, it is perhaps unsurprising that civil rights ac-
tivists and LEAs view the discussed matters from different
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perspectives. And it is perhaps equally unsurprising that there
also are great cultural differences between the US and Europe
in how various stakeholders view the relevant consider-
ations and how these considerations should be balanced.This
seems to have resulted in a disconnect between the various
initiatives taken in this arena in Europe and the US. If a so-
lution with potential for long-term success is to be found, we
necessarily must map out and agree upon what are the rel-
evant considerations.The above has all been aimed at this first
step.
If the fundamental constraints outlined above are ac-
cepted as an appropriate description of these considerations,
stakeholders should proceed to enter into a dialogue as to how
these considerations ought to be balanced; because one thing
is certain, insisting on absolute privacy protection or unfet-
tered LEA access to data will get us nowhere. And if we fail to
find appropriately balanced solutions, we should not expect
a status quo to be maintained. As said, unilateral solutions to
extend enforcement jurisdiction outside of the territorial borders
are not sustainable in the long term.41 Given the urgency of
the problem however, that practice is likely to increase rather
than decrease.
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